That's how I got to Bosnia. We had been . . . the terrain
analysis section was put together and we were advising the
Canadian military and, and the government as well, on the terrain
weather, and weather effects on how they were going to work in
foreign countries, and UN missions, and NATO missions and
that. And the, the aspect of what is the terrain and weather
going, how is it going to effect the Canadian troops and their
mission, but also the warring factions, how are they going to
be affected, what are they going to be able to do, and how can we
anticipate what they're going to do. So we had different
methodologies of finding and detecting mine fields. Not only
finding them on the ground, the hard way by blowing them up, but
anticipating where these things might be and where the warring
factions might be, to put something up. So, we would
exercise with Canadian troops at various levels, brigade levels
and that. But we were doing a lot of strategic work . . . country
writing country reports and studies. This was all at the
beginning. We were, we were making this up as we went along.
Did a drug introduction into Saint-Pierre de Miquelon, for the
RCMP, where would planes of this size be able to land and how
were the ships coming in and where, where possibly could these
things be found and that, so what was happening. Then it . . had
opportunity. It was the director of cartography had gone overseas
too, as an engineering officer, as an Engineering Co . . .
Colonel, and he had met up and worked with Colonel Woloschuk,
who was a Strathcona at the time, an armoured officer, Lieutenant
Colonel, and we were working together. And the engineer was
telling the armoured corps about this great wonderful thing
called terrain analysis and how it could help save lives, have
his troops, give him better information and anticipatory
information and that. So, there was great interest and then the
Strathconas, my old unit, was tasked to go back. They were
the Strathconas were tasked to go to Bosnia. And the Colonel was
going over as the CO of the Strathconas, Colonel Woloschuk,
and he came down and visited and had a look at what we were
proposing to do. Not at a strategic level, but the service
we could provide to them at the technical level, in the field, on
the ground, with the people there. And he liked it, so he
gave up two riflemen, and myself and Master Corporal Dowling, or
Downing, Dowling, Master Corporal Dowling went over. But it was,
was quite different because we didn’t have the . . . we knew
what the task was, was support the battle group, but there was
no definition of how to do that. No, no product that we were
systematically producing or anything else, so we were, we
were forging through on new ground. And I specifically asked
for that task. I'd been offered an exchange posting with the
Americans in Germany for three years, and a one year posting
with the United Nations to Zagreb, and a possible six month
posting with the Strathconas at the tactical level in Bosnia. So
I turned down the other two, which were career movers, to do
the one that hadn't been done. The other two had been done
before, people had been there and the, and the tactical level had
never been done. So, we were the first ones to do it.